Beware Mission Creep in Afghanistan
31 July 2009 9:55 am by Taylor Marsh
It’s edging towards being official. Having supported Obama’s initial Afghanistan policy, it’s becoming abundantly clear that we’re edging closer to no man’s land on policy:
The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan is preparing a new strategy that calls for major changes in the way U.S. and other NATO troops there operate, a vast increase in the size of Afghan security forces and an intensified military effort to root out corruption among local government officials, according to several people familiar with the contents of an assessment report that outlines his approach to the war.
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who took charge of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan last month, appears inclined to request an increase in American troops to implement the new strategy, which aims to use more unconventional methods to combat the growing Taliban insurgency, according to members of an advisory group he convened to work on the assessment. Such a request could receive a chilly reception at the White House, where some members of President Obama’s national security team have expressed reluctance about authorizing any more deployments. …
Let’s hope the “chilly reception at the White House” includes a definitive no to go along with it. That is unless McChrystal can make a conclusive case, including other strategy shifts currently happening in Afghanistan.
The article above follows the one yesterday on drones being retasked to hit Taliban, not al Qaeda, which is yet another shift in strategy since McChrystal came aboard. (Also see Peter Bergen’s June piece on drones, which he says have served a purpose in FATA.)
Barbara Starr on the McChrystal’s likely coming request, which will be made after the Afghan war review that’s due around August 14th, during the congressional recess:
The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan is expected to ask the Obama administration for additional troops and equipment, according to a senior U.S. military official familiar with Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s thinking. Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s report on the war’s status will be delivered in August, the source says.
The request will be for troops and equipment for conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as more assets to deal with roadside bombs and explosives, said the official, who declined to be identified because McChrystal’s request has not been formally transmitted to the Pentagon.
Gates has signaled he’s open to an increase, but no one in the Administration has given signs about the ongoing mission in Afghanistan.
One of Obama’s primary reasons for expanding U.S. troop pressence at the beginning of his presidency was the goal of keeping Afghanistan from becoming a failed state. It seems clear that is no longer a danger, with Taliban forces and their influences becoming the greater challenge, especially with corruption running rampant across Afghanistan.
Recently, there was also an article about the U.S. getting involved with Afghanistan prison reform, but not just American-led prisons such as Bagram, which is seen as “tougher and more spartan” than Gitmo, creating a situation ready to explode. Karen J. Greenberg, author of “Least Worst Place: Guantanamo’s First 100 Days,” said at a book forum I attended at New America Foundation, that what she was hearing about Bagram was worse than anything coming out of Gitmo. Inmate conditions horrific, which is now no secret: The prisoners have fewer privileges and virtually no access to lawyers or the judicial process. Many are still held communally in big cages.
A sweeping United States military review calls for overhauling the troubled American-run prison here as well as the entire Afghan jail and judicial systems, a reaction to worries that abuses and militant recruiting within the prisons are helping to strengthen the Taliban.
So, what’s our current purpose and mission in Afghanistan? I knew what it was before. I don’t now.


