NIE on Iraq
02 February 2007 9:45 am by Taylor Marsh
NIE on Iraq –updated below–
The bottom line of the NIE on Iraq is that the Iraq war is now larger than a civil war. Shorter version: everyone is fighting everyone. As for who is to blame, let\’s just say even if Iran and Syria are meddling it\’s not going to give Bush his out.
Here are some key points from the NIE (for more see Spencer Ackerman).
Key Judgments
Iraqi society\’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of
the security forces and the state in general, and all sides\’ ready recourse
to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent
violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions
show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to
18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to
deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. … ..- Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all
attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders
will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the
time frame of this Estimate.The challenges confronting Iraqis are daunting, and multiple factors
are driving the current trajectory of the country\’s security and political
evolution.(snip)
- Despite real improvements, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) – particularly
the Iraqi police – will be hard pressed in the next 12-18 months to execute
significantly increase security responsibilities, and particularly to operate
independently against Shia militias with success. Sectarian divisions erode
the dependability of many units, many are hampered by personnel and equipment
shortfalls, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside of the
areas where they were recruited. … … ..The Intelligence Community judges that the term \”civil war\”
does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which
includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa\’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks
on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless,
the term \”civil war\” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi
conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population
displacements.Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations,
remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces
were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this
almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope
of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensity Sunni resistance to the Iraq Government,
and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.- If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would
be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring
countries-invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally-might intervene openly
in the conflict, massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement
would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country–particularly
al-Anbar province-to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling
violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control
Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.
… ..
How do we stop the unraveling?
The NIE has a couple of things \”could help,\” but there are
no guarantees at this point:
\”Broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and
federalism,\” is one hope. (NOTE: There is no evidence that Maliki is interested
in reconciliation with the Sunnis, or that they are interested either.)\”Significant concessions by Shia and Kurds to create a space
for Sunni acceptance of federalism.\” (See above. Good luck.)\”A bottom-up approach …\”
If everything fails, which has been the case so far, the NIE says we\’re looking at \”chaos leading to
partition,\” the \”emergence of a Shia strongman,\”
and \”anarchic fragmentation of power.\”
As for Iran.
Iraqi\’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within
Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major
driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining
character of Iraq\’s internal sectarian dynamics. Nonetheless, Iranian
lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies
the conflict in Iraq. Syria continues to provide safehaven for expatriate
Iraqi Bathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of
foreign jihadists into Iraq.
Mr. Bush isn\’t going to like that analysis, because what it means is that he
can\’t blame this fiasco on Iran. Well, he can, but it\’s a lie. But you won\’t
hear that on right-wing talk radio.
UPDATE (12:17 p.m.): Stephen Hadley rambles on trying to make \”success\” sound different from this plan sucks.
