Co-Dependency in Iraq
07 October 2006 7:00 am by Taylor Marsh
Co-Dependency in Iraq
expert analysis by Charles
Pena
One of the judgments in the
most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concludes, “The war
in Iraq has become a primary recruitment vehicle for violent Islamic extremists,
motivating a new generation of potential terrorists around the world whose numbers
may be increasing faster than the United States and its allies can reduce the
threat.” Of course, President
Bush cites another judgment in the NIE — “Should jihadists leaving
Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters
will be inspired to carry on the fight” — to make the case that “withdrawing
from Iraq before the enemy is defeated would embolden the terrorists.”
So the Bush administration continues to insist that Iraq is the central front
in the war on terrorism and that we must stay the course. At a congressional
fundraiser earlier this week, the
president said, “We will stay in Iraq, we will fight in Iraq, and we
will win in Iraq.”
Apparently, that’s just fine with al Qaeda. According to a letter thought to
be written by a senior Al Qaeda leader, Atiyah
Abd al-Rahman, “The most important thing is that the jihad continues
with steadfastness … indeed, prolonging the war is in our interest.”
Thus, it seems the Bush administration and al Qaeda have developed a co-dependent
relationship.
President Bush maintains that “failure
in Iraq is not an option,”. This is what I wrote back
in November 2005.
Even if victory could somehow be achieved, it would be Pyrrhic given the costs
and consequences. Moreover, it would only be a tactical victory at the expense
of losing strategic position in the war on terrorism. What the Bush administration
refuses to understand is that the U.S. military occupation in Iraq is part of
the problem, not part of the solution.
Therefore, the strategic imperative is to exit Iraq rather than stay. And
although it is counterintuitive, exiting Iraq may be a prerequisite for victory.
Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once asked, “Are we capturing, killing or
deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the
radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?” What
he failed to ask is whether U.S. actions — including the invasion and subsequent
occupation of Iraq — are contributing to increasing the terrorist threat. To
be sure, President Bush is right when he says “Iraq is not the reason the
terrorists are at war against us.” But Iraq is a reason for more Muslims
to become terrorists. Consider that according to a poll conducted last month,
61% of Iraqis approved of attacks on U.S. forces — compared to 20% in September
2003 and 40% in April 2004.
Another judgment of the NIE was: “The jihadists’ greatest vulnerability
is that their ultimate political solution — an ultra-conservative interpretation
of shari’a-based governance spanning the Muslim world — is unpopular with the
vast majority of Muslims.” In other words, what we call the war on terrorism
is, first and foremost, a struggle inside the Islamic world. As such, it must
ultimately be waged and won by Muslims themsleves.
And it is important to understand that even through President Bush asserts
that “the terrorists are at war against us because they hate everything
America stands for,” the reality is that — as Michael Scott Doran wrote
in Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 2002 — “War with the United States
was not a goal in and of itself but rather an instrument to help his brand of
extremist Islam survive and flourish among the believers.” And the reason
America has become a target for al Qaeda is because we have inserted ourselves
in somebody else’s civil war.
The implication is that if Iraq is the central front in the war on terrorism,
then the United States must be willing to let the Iraqis wage the war against
al Qaeda in Iraq. It is worth noting that the same poll that showed 61% percent
of Iraqis approving of attacks on U.S. forces also found that 94% had an unfavorable
view of al Qaeda (82%
had a very unfavorable view).
Ultimately, the only way to undercut Iraq being “the ’cause celebre’ for
jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world
and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement” is to recognize
the co-dependency and remove the primary reason and target: the U.S. military.
Finally, we must be willing to accept the possibility that the outcome might not
be the democracy sought by the Bush administration or even a government that
is friendly to the United States. But our strategic interests will have been
served.
